Characterization of Non-Minority Rules

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Abstract

It is shown that a social decision rule is (a) p-non-minority rule, $\frac{1}{2} \leq p < 1$, iff it satisfies the conditions of (i) independence of irrelevant alternatives (ii) neutrality (iii) monotonicity (iv) weak Pareto-criterion (v) anonymity and (vi) its structure is such that a coalition is blocking iff it is strictly blocking; (b) simple non-minority rule iff it satisfies conditions (i) — (vi) and its structure is such that every proper superset of a blocking coalition is winning; (c) simple non-minority rule defined for an odd number of individuals iff it satisfies conditions (i) — (iii), (v), (vi) and its structure is such that a coalition is blocking iff it is winning.